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1. Introduction
High unemployment and unacceptable levels of social exclusion in Europe inspired the
European Commission to launch the Fourth Research Promotion Programme on Targeted
Socio-Economic Research. The research group Social Integration by Transitional Labour
Markets, coordinated by the Social Science Research Centre in Berlin, is one of the groups
that try to make a contribution to a considerable reduction of the problems mentioned
above. The Department of Sociology of Tilburg University, The Netherlands, is one of the
participants in the research.
The research programme consists of four modules:
1. a module on Theory of Transitional Labour Markets;
2. a module on Households and Working Time Flexibility;
3. a module on Active Labour Market Policy;
4. a module on Training and Human Capital Investment.
With the exception of module four our department participates in all modules.
The present paper is meant to be a theoretical contribution to the modules two and three.
The outline is as follows.
We start with a brief statement of the central research problem. Then the key objectives of
the program will be sketched. In the next section we present an overview of labour market
theories which are currently used for the explanations of unemployment and which have
implications for the understanding of social exclusion. Discussion of the theories presented
will lead us to suggest an alternative approach. To that end we will first dwell on litera-
ture about coordination regimes, conceived as institutions, and coordination mechanisms.
In that section we propose some connections between coordination regimes and ideologies
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as expressions of basic value-patterns. Finally we present a more integrated socio-econ-
omic approach, which can be used in the research programme Social Integration by
Transitional Labour Markets.
2. The central problem
The leading research problem can be formulated as follows: Which mixture of institutions
in the economic-political and social-cultural spheres can be expected to contribute to
favourable socio-economic performance, i.e. low unemployment and low exclusion, and
which combinations of coordination regimes will probably produce poor socio-economic
performance, i.e. high unemployment and high exclusion?
G. Schmid has proposed to tackle the problem in terms of what he calls a theory of
transitional labour markets. It is his conviction that the relationships between institutions
and social exclusion~integration are mediated by labour markets: 'The key hypothesis is
that the borders between the labour market and other social systems such as education and
family life have to become more open for transitory states between gainful employment
and productive non-market activities in order to alleviate present high structural unem-
ployment, to prevent further exclusion from the labour market and to reduce segmentation
or occupational segregation of the labour market.' (Schmid 1996: 2)
Transitional labour markets are characterized by open borders with other social systems
and encourage mobility ('transitions') across these borders without inducing downward
spirals of social exclusion. They are supposed to optimize people's lifetime societal parti-
cipation.
The concept is developed on the basis of a'modernized concept of full employment'
defined as 'an average working time of 30 hours a week over a life cycle of both men and
women'. Transitional employment are 'called the phases in the life cycle in which the
working time deviates substantially from the new standard of 30 hours.' Examples are
spells of short time work, training and retraining, temporary leaves. Transitional labour
markets are 'institutional arrangements that allow such intermediate phases.' (Schmid
1996: 4) The necessity of mobility and flexibility together with the idea of 'work sharing',
which is seen as expressing a cooperative attitudes, are the core ideas on which the theory
is built.
According to Schmid five types of transitional labour market can be distinguished: 'transi-
tions between short-time work or part-time work and full-time employment, or transitions
between dependent work and self-employment or a combination of both (1); transitions
between unemployment and employment (2); transitions between education or training and
employment (3); transitions between private (domestic work and employment (4); and
transitions from employment to retirement (5).' (Schmid 1996: 9)
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His paper is largely devoted to an assessment of the different ways in which active labour
market policies could promote patterns of mobility that conform to the principles of
productivity enhancing flexibility and work-sharing. The possible contributions of public
or politically induced policies form a prominent part of Schmid's argument.
In our paper we will try to broaden the scope of the approach. We will concentrate on
interdependencies between different societal spheres and the institutions that are part of
them. The goal is to explore the ways in which these interdependencies might influence
the transitional labour market processes and outcomes that Schmid has drawn our attention
to.
3. The key objectives
The key objectives of our research are:
l: the development of new theoretical and empirical knowledge about social exclusion
and social integration in Europe;
2: to strengthen the theoretical, empirical and methodological basis of the social
sciences in the countries of the European Union in the field of social exclusion and
integration;
3: to contribute to social integration policies, in dialogue with groups of key policy-
makers and representatives of institutions that are actively involved in combatting
social exclusion and promoting social integration.
4. Theories of the labour market: promises and limits
4.1 Irttroduction
It is possible to distinguish three general conceptions of the labour market (H. Pfriem,
1979: W. Bremer, 1991; A. Glebbeek, 1993):
A. the labour market as an exchange market;
B. the labour market as an arena;
C. the labour market as an institution, as an organization.
Each conception or paradigm has engendered a number of specific theories.
4.2 Theories within the paradigm of the labour market as an exchange market
We distinguish four theories within the paradigm of the labour market as an exchange
market.
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Scheme 1. Theories within the paradigm of the labour market as exchange market
The Labour Market as an Exchange Market
l. The neoclassical economic theory
2. The search-theory: the result of relaxing the assumption of complete informati-
on typical of neoclassical theory
3. The human capital theory: the result of relaxing the assumption of homogeneity
of labour typical of neoclassical theory
4. The efficiency wage model: the assumptions of certainty and complete infor-
mation are relaxed; the assumption of risk-sharing adopted
4.2.1 The neoclassical economic theory of the labour market
The central assumptions of neoclassical economic theory are:
l. Perfect competition:
1.1 Free wage determination: high supply and demand so that no single party is able to
set the wage rate;
1.2 Complete information;
1.3 Homogeneous labour resulting in perfect mobility
2. The objective of individuals is the maximization of economic utility (economic
rationality)
3. The labour market will reach equilibrium (because of the assumptions one and
two):
- a wage level with equilibrium between demand and supply;
- differences in wages express different levels of productivity. (De Galan, 1981)
Theories 2 and 3 are derived after relaxing the assumptions of complete information and
homogeneity of labour, respectively (see scheme 1).
4.2.2 The search theory
Compared with the neoclassical economic theory the assumption of complete information
is relaxed in the search theory. Relaxing this assumption produces a scientific problem,
which the search theory tries to solve. C. Holt (1971) is one of the relevant writers.
Information is limited in the labour market. Acquiring information is not costless, but it
might help finding a better job. Job hunting employees have either to accept a job with a
given pay or they have to continue looking for a higher paid job. They will go on looking
for a job as long as the subjectively (expected) extra pay exceeds the extra (expected)
search costs. The best available job will be accepted when the marginal benefits equal the
marginal costs.
In the search theory it is assumed that employees are looking for new or other jobs
because of the expectation of better paid jobs. Employers are also looking for employees.
They keep vacancies unfilled because they expect to find cheaper employees. In the search
4
theory the assumptions of free competition, homogeneity of labour and maximization of
economic utility are maintained.
The macro level variant of the search theory is a labour turnover theory. This focuses on
flows and transitions of job seeking employees and vacancies.
4.2.3 The human capital theorv
The human capital relaxes the assumption that labour is homogeneous (Gary Becker,
1964). Investment in human capital is analyzed as a utility maximizing decision. Education
and training are the archetypes of this kind of investment. An higher educated employee is
more productive and will receive a higher income. Scheme 2 illustrates these connections.
Scheme 2. Causal relationships between human capital, productivity and income.
investments in t t
human capital ---~ productivity ---~ income
Differences of human capital imply heterogeneity of labour.
4.2.4 The efficienci~ wage model
The efficiency wage theory tries to explain wage rigidity in the case of excess-supply of
employees. Then the wages are above the market clearing rate. Why are the wages not
flexible? The theory seeks the explanation in a remarkable reversal of causality between
income and productivity, as compared to neoclassical theory. The causal relationship,
though unchanged positive, is seen to run from income to productivity. Employers and
employees share risks. Employees adjust their productivity to the wage paid. The advan-
tages of efficiency wages are:
- Forced dismissal is a real sanction;
- Turnover is restricted;
- Internal training becomes profitable;
- Their functioning as a motivating signal ;
- Efficiency wages enable employers to match persons and jobs. (A. Glebbeek, 1993)
Given their interests in the control of the labour process employers face strong incentives
to put the wage level above the market price. The resulting efficiency wages are a cause
for labour market segmentation.
A characteristic of the four theories within the paradigm of the labour market as an
exchange market is the emphasis on individualistic and economic rationality. The theories
materialize in equilibrium models.
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The most important policy recommendations resulting from the paradigm of the labour
market as an exchange market are:
- lower benefits than wages and abolition of minimum wages are expected to spur
economic incentives
- free wage determination, flexible dismissal law and the abolition of collective agree
ments;
- encouragement of education and training.
4.3 Theories tivithin the paradigm of the labour market as an arena
4.3.1 Introduction
Within the paradigm of the labour market as arena we distinguish three theories (see
scheme 3).
Scheme 3. Theories within the paradigm of the labour market as an arena
The Labour Market as an Arena
1. The Neo-Marxist Conflict-theory, in particular the Theory of the Reserve Army
2. The Segmentation Theory
3. The Radical Labour Market Theory
The paradigm of the labour market as an arena contains three essential elements:
1. An important opposition between capital and labour, owners of the means of
production and non-owners.
2. Employees have no choice but to supply their labour capacity if they want to
survive.
3. There is a distinction between labour capacity and labour performance. Labour
capacity is supplied, not labour performance. Via the labour contract the labour
capacity is transferred. The labour contract is a source of conflicts.
Employers strive after efficiency, low wages and wage-costs, and control of the labour
performances. There is a strong parallel between the opposition of interests in the labour
market and those in the labour process. Important themes are the influence of labour
relations on the labour market and on collective conflict and property.
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4.3.2 The Neo-Marxist Theorv of the Labour Reserve Army
In their attempts to control the labour process and to achieve efficiency, employers typi-
cally engage in strategies of divide and rule. Wages are the outcomes of power processes.
Employers' behaviour is mainly economizing. Technical innovations are designed and
introduced in order to reduce the volume and quality of employees. The internal market is
kept as small as possible.
Labour market processes can not be explained in terms of free market exchange. The
superior power position of the employers within the labour process determines the distri-
bution of the proceeds as well as of privileges.
The capitalist labour process involves both a formal and a real subordination of labour,
and it is characterized by a sharp division of control and execution.
Ongoing rationalizations have two important results:
1. the constant degradation of functions and segmentation;
2. a structural labour reserve army.
The degradation of functions and the concomitant segmentation process produce a fall in
wages. The existence of the labour reserve army facilitates the disciplining of employees.
Unemployment is an inevitable result of rationalization. Inequality is a result of segmenta-
tion into a privileged primary segment, a subordinate primary segment and a secondary
segment with sub-class.
According to some authors capitalist development passes through two phases:
1. a phase of economic growth characterized by capital widening investments which
do not lead to a significant increase in productivity as measured by the production
function. Wages and employment rates initially rise. As strong increases of wages
erode the returns to labour, the demand for labour decreases. Wages fall and the
accumulation ratio increases.
2. The second phase of accumulation of capital is linked to changes in production
technology which entail a relative decrease of employment. Aggregate demand
does not rise, and consequently the demand for labour decreases. The relatively
more productive firms attain higher market shares which are reinforced by concen-
tration processes, like mergers etc.. (W. Semmler and J. Hoffmann, 1972)
4.3.3 The Segmentation Theorv
The starting point of the segmentation theory is the consumers' market (Altman and
Bechle (1971), Lutz and Sengenberger (1974), Sengenberger (1975), Mendius a.o. (1976)).
Control of the labour process and the achievement of a measure of autonomy from societal
developments are important strategies in the pursuit of profit. The segmentation theory has
two variants: a more conjunctural variant, and a more structural one.
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Conjunctural fluctuations in supply and demand of goods and services cause two proces-
ses:
1. temporary adaptation of supply of products and of production factors by measures
that stimulate performance and speed, flexibilization of the volume of employees as
well as time flexibility. Time flexibility can be increased by changes in labour
time, overtime, irregular work hours, easier hiring and firing practices.
2. stabilization of the marketing of products by manipulation of delivery time and
stocks.
These two processes lead to a dual labour market. The reactions to the conjunctural
fluctuations result in segmentation which implies a reduction of mobility. There is a stable
segment, which is minimally necessary for survival during an economic downturn. In
addition there is a variable secondary segment that consists of employees with low quali-
fications, who are cheap and easy to recruit. Developments in consuming markets also
result in a dualization of firms and sectors.
Structural developments result in a segmentation of three markets:
occupational markets. Here one finds a broad array of occupational education,
knowledge and skills. As the skills of employees are potentially useful for other
firms as well, it is not rewarding for individual firms to invest in human capital.
Investments by the employees themselves in occupational skills can be rewarding.
firm-internal markets. The qualifications are firm-specific. The firm provides on-
the-job-training. Allocation and reward occur according to institutional rules of
entrance, seniority, promotion and wage-systems.
non specific open markets. General qualifications and low levels of required educa-
tion are the rule here. Without loss of production these qualifications are of poten-
tial use for all sorts of firms. The employees are mobile. The principles of market
exchange determine the price and use of their skills.
4.3.4 The radical labour market theorv
The radical labour market theory was originally formulated by the labour economists
Reich, Gordon and Edwards (1975). The production process, in which the use of labour
capacity is situated, constitutes the point of departure. The demand side of the labour
market dominates the production process. The behaviour in the external labour market
reflects the processes of production. The institutional rules governing the control of
production, the social production relationships and the conflicts of interests have to be
examined. The principle of divide and rule is widespread. The structure of the demand
side determines the segmentation of the labour market. Employers actively bring about
segregation within the ranks of the employees. Economic efficiency and control are
objectives.
The following strategies of control can be distinguished:
l. Taylorism, formal rules and procedures, a bureaucratic control system, separation
of control and execution.
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2. Internal markets with assessment of performance, wage and promotion systems
based on norms with respect to behaviour and performance.
3. Job requirements are embedded in educational qualifications which separate the
primary from the secondary segment; hierarchy and classification are dominant
features.
4. A separation exists between core and peripheral firms, which is strongly associated
with dualism in working conditions and patterns of mobility.
5. Manipulation by employers also extends to the external market where employees
are played off against each other, on the basis of characteristics like sex, ethnicity
and age. The chances that employees organize themselves and even might oppose
the employers are minimized in this way.
Segmentation of the labour market is supportive of capitalist hegemony. The strategies
institutionalize labour discipline and social behaviour in the context of the control system.
4.4 Theories within the paradigm of the labour market as institution
4.4.1 Irztroduction
In this paradigm the role of institutions moves to the forefront. We will discuss three
theories.
Scheme 4. Theories within the paradigm of the labour market as institution
The Labour Market as an Institution
]. The theory of non-competing groups.
2. The theory of the dual labour market.
3. The job-competition theory.
4.4.2 The theorv of non-competing groups
Some labour economists and sociologists emphasize institutiona] and administrative rules
(J. Dunlop, 1958; L. Reynolds, 1951, 1956; J. Lulofs, 1960; W. van Voorden, 1975). The
model of open, free competition doesn't hold because of:
- the existence of non-competing groups;
- the existence of types of market such as monopoly;
- the use of collective power in wage-bargaining;
- relative autonomy of agreements, i.e. a limited impact of market processes.
9
In the case of non-competing groups wages are not determined by market forces, but by
power processes, institutions and customs, which were traditionally regarded as market
external factors. A division between the wage market and the job market is observed.
Collective agreements play a crucial role in the process of wage determination. This
process is highly institutionalized by collective bargaining and agreements. The allocation
process is also institutionalized by the operation of formal systems. Not only the allocation
function of the labour market is important, but the distribution function as well.
Kerr (1982) was one of the first scientists, who made a distinction between a closed and
an open segment. The closed segment is been structured in agreement with a set of rules
and is linked to specific firms and occupations. In the open segment market principles
determine wages and allocation. Kerr does not explain why this segmentation arises. The
theory of the dual labour market proposes some explanations.
4.4.3 The theory of dual labour market
Doeringer and Piore (1971) are the fathers of the dual labour market. Reciprocal influen-
ces between production structures and labour market structure form the starting point of
the theory. The fundamental distinction is between:
- the primary segment where the stable, better paid jobs offering career opportunities
in internal markets are concentrated;
- the secondary segment with bad jobs and poor perspectives.
An internal market is an administrative unit, within which, based on administrative rules
and procedures, the processes of wage determination and allocation take place. As conse-
quences of technological developments, the specific features of on-the-job-training and the
development of customs firm specific rules and procedures, come into being. In the
secondary market a vicious circle of exclusion and stigmatization evolves: prejudiced
groups on the base of estimated productivity ~ no entrance to permanent jobs and
internal education 1 insufficient skills ~ unstable career ~ preju-
diced groups.
4.4.4 The job competition model
L. Thurow introduced the job competition theory (L. Thurow, 1975; J. van Wezel, 1979).
Productivity is analysed as a characteristic of jobs, not of employees. Wage competition
gives way to job competition. Equilibrium is not explained in terms of the price mecha-
nism, but it is seen as a consequence of (change in) selection standards. The concepts of
relative education rank and schooling costs are important. Employers rank employees on
the base of estimated education and training costs, indicated by basic characteristics such
as education, sex, ethnicity, age and experience. This process is called statistical discrimi-
nation. The resulting queue is led by the persons with the lowest estimated training costs;
employees with high education costs close the ranks. When the number of jobs is lower
than the number of work seeking persons, the employees in the last positions are crowded
out of the market. Higher educated persons get jobs that used to be given to persons with
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intermediate levels of education, etc. etc. The lowest educated persons become unemploy-
ed.
4.5 Conclusion
In the present section we have presented a brief overview of ten theories of the labour
market, ordered into three paradigms. Though useful for many purposes the theories do
not add up to a coherent picture of labour market processes. For several reasons this is a
situation that should be remedied:
- Most theories are general; this means that they include or imply empirical genera-
lization which, even in the case of clear empirical substantiation, do not even yield
an only remotely comprehensive analysis of the labour market.
- Being not comprehensive the theories must be seen as theories of the middle range.
The question is then: what relations do these theories bear to one another?;
- With the exception of the neoclassical theory clear ideas about possible equilibria
are missing. We need a more balanced theory of the conditions of equilibria;
- With respect to methodological matters the theories show differences which should
be explicitly addressed and perhaps remedied: some theories emphasize individua-
listic and micro level characteristics, whereas others concentrate on collective and
macro level characteristics; some theories emphasize processes related to utility and
power, whereas other theories point at mechanisms that are expected to produce
solidarity, trust and a sense of justice. We need more clarity in these matters and
perhaps some methodological and theoretical bridges.
- The partial and provisional character of the theories is not sufficiently emphasized.
This means that the danger of committing the fallacy of misplaced concreteness is
looming which could be very harmful when policy recommendations are formula-
ted.
In order to improve the scientific relevance of labour market theory as well as its relevan-
ce for the design of policies we propose to broaden the scope of the theory.
In the following sections we will present a more general and integrated conceptual fra-
mework. Within this framework the more restricted theories, like for instance the ones we
have discussed, can play a valuable role.
We like to emphasize that we regard the framework to be presented as a formal model as
advocated by R. Boudon (1986, 1987). According to Boudon the search for social-scienti-
fic laws is doomed to remain unsuccessful. The most we can achieve is to arrive at
explanations of concrete events, processes or relationships in terms of models, defined as
'a deductive system resting upon highly simplifying assumptions'. (Boudon 1987: 55) A
theoretical model does not as such admit empirical predictions. It 'is formal in the sense
that it does not apply to any real situation, but is rather a kind of framework that needs to
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be filled out once we propose to use it to account for observations about the real world.'
(Boudon 1986: 202)
Acc~rding to Boudon the 'filling out' can best be done with the help of the method of
decreasing abstraction. In our case this will involve, amongst other things, the empirical
interpretation and operationalization of abstract concepts, the specification of the instituti-
onal context and the specification of actors and their mutual dependencies. Throughout the
process, the proper rules of parsimony have to observed (see below 6.3.1).
We will first examine some recent publications which deal with theoretical approaches to
coordination regimes and mechanisms. This literature might provide suggestions as to how
to elaborate a more complete theoretical framework that can hopefully be made fruitful for
the study of transitional labour markets.
5. Theoretical approaches to coordination regimes and mechanisms
5.1 Coordination regimes and mechanisms
Various models of coordination regimes and mechanisms have been described in the
literature. M. Havekes (1993), J. van Wezel (1992, 1994) and J. van Wezel and M. Have-
kes (1995) have summarized these approaches. Some authors emphasize the institutional
form of coordination, other writers the coordination mechanisms. These mechanisms
constitute the link between structure and action. In the next scheme a typology of coordi-
nation regimes and coordination mechanisms is given. Two dimensions are relevant: the
dimension freedom (first column) versus limiting controls (second column) and the dimen-
sion inequality (first row) versus equality (second row).
Ouchi ( 1980) distinguishes between markets, bureaucracies and clans.
Williamson (1981) makes an distinction between a spot-market, an obligational market, a
relational team and a primitive team.
Streeck and Schmitter (1991) have distinguished four coordination regimes and associated
coordination mechanisms: markets coordinated by competition, the state coordinated by
hierarchical control, community coordinated by spontaneous solidarity, and associations
coordínated by organized concertation.
Fiske (1991) focuses on process related coordination mechanisms. He distinguishes four
elementary types of interaction and claims that these form the basis for all human actions
in social relations: market pricing, authority ranking, equality matching and communal
sharing.
Schmid (1992, 1993) stresses markets coordinated by prices, hierarchies coordinated by
power, networks coordinated by trust and civil rights coordinated by solidarity.
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Thompson (1993) has used slightly different dimensions. He uses the dimension competi-
tivelcooperative instead of the inequalitylequality dimension. The dimension free-
domlcontrols is replaced by independence vs. hierarchy.
In the analytical model of Parsons and Smelser the following structures are used: econ-
omy, polity, societal community and social-cultural system. In the article 'Equality and
Inequality in Modern Society, or Social Stratification Revisited' Parsons (1977) used the
dimensions inequalitylequality and freedomlconstraints as constitutive for this scheme.
Scheme 5. A typology of coordination regimes and coordination mechanisms
l market 1 bureaucracy
2 spot-market 2 obligational market
3 market: competition 3 state: hierarchical control
4 :market-pricing 4 :authority ranking
5 market: prices 5 hierarchies: power
6 classic market 6 bureaucracy
7 economy: money 7 polity: power
------------------- 1 clan
2 primitive team 2 relational team
3 association: organized concertation 3 community: spontaneous solidarity
4: equality matching 4:communal sharing
5 network: trust 5 civil rights: solidarity
6 network structure 6 clan
7 social-cultural system: commitment 7 societal community: influence
1. Ouchi (1980).
2. Williamson ( l 981).
3. Streeck and Schmitter (1991).
4. Fiske (1991).
5. Schmid (1993, 1994).
6. Thompson (1993).
7. Parsons and Smelser (1956).
Streeck and Schmitter establish a direct relation between the coordination regimes and the
coordination mechanisms.
Schmid refers to regulatory media: prices for the market, power for the bureaucracy, trust
for the network and solidarity for the civil rights.
It should be mentioned here that, following recent developments in labour economics,
Schmid analyzes trust and solidarity as playing an indispensable role in any conceivable
process of simultaneously optimizing the important societal goals of equality and effi-
13
ciency (productivity) (Schmid 1994).
Trust and solidarity enable effective and productive cooperation: 'considerations of incen-
tive and justice speak against excessive wage differentials' (Schmid 1994: 268). According
to Schmid the willingness of employees to apply their 'tacit knowledge' is crucial in a
time in which competition is strongly based on both process and product innovation. The
capacity and willingness of people to reciprocate is essential for Schmid. Institutional
arrangements which can be expected to enhance reciprocation should be promoted.
Schmid also argues for what he calls 'civil rights' institutions, defined as: 'Institutions that
endow individuals with entitlements ... according to socially accepted standards of equality
and independent of individuals' capacity to reciprocate .... Their exchange medium is
solidarity ...' Civil rights, consisting for instance the expectation of 'a fair replacement of
... wage in case of unemployment', are considered an important institution governing the
employment relationship. They provide and help maintain the incentive structure that is
indispensable to cooperation and productivity (Schmid ] 994: 260). In a transitional labour
market they create the sense of security that is needed when people are adversely con-
fronted with the consequences of economic flexibility.
The four coordination regimes can be seen as ideal types, which hardly ever appear in
pure form in the empirical reality. Each corresponds to one of the four mechanisms. It
seems highly probable that the empirical 'unpure' manifestations take the shape of mixtu-
res of the four types of regimes and mechanisms.
An interesting problem concerns the explanation of institutionally mixed types of coordi-
nation regimes. We think that this problem can be solved if one focuses in the first place
on the mechanisms involved. The argument is that these mechanisms directly refer to
behavioural patterns which in general function as the source from which institutional
forms, including coordination regimes, originate.
The mixtures of coordination regimes consist of the various mechanisms, and can be
identified in te.rms of these mechanisms. Combinations of coordination mechanisms make
many more institutiona] forms possible. Different coordination regimes often exist side by
side. The processes that give rise to mixed coordination regimes can be interpreted as
'interactions' between the constituent regimes and mechanisms. The idea of interchange
via coordination mechanisms between the four coordination regimes can be found in the
societal model of Parsons and Smelser (1956).
5.2 Coordination regimes and ideologies, basic value-patterns
It is very interesting that the above-discussed dimensions also appear in research about
ideologies and values: freedorr~controls and inequalitylequality. This suggests possible
links between coordination regimes on the one hand and ideologies and basic value-
patterns on the other hand.
l4
We can distinguish the following four value-patterns (Triandis 1994; Schwartz 1994;
Jenssen 1995; see scheme 6).
Scheme 6. Four basic value-patterns: four basic ideologies
Individualism Collectivism
(Freedom) (Limiting controls)
Authoritarianism Authoritarian Individualism Authoritarian Collectivism
(Inequality)
Egalitarianism Egalitarian Individualism Egalitarian Collectivism
(Equality)
Jenssen summarizes the basic dimensions as follows: 'Interpersonal values are beliefs
about what is desirable in the interaction between humans...Authoritarian values mean the
acceptance of superiority and subordination as natural and desirable in human relations.
Egalitarian values mean regarding parity of power as desirable in human relations. Individ-
ualism maintains that independence and self-reliance are natural and desirable. Collecti-
vism stands for the desirability of loyalty and mutual responsibility between human
beings' (Jenssen, 1995: 56-57).
6. An integrated socio-economic model
6.1 Introduction: our research strategy
Universities have a critical-intellectual task in society. The overview of theories about the
labour market and the literature about coordination regimes, mechanisms and basic value-
patterns leads us to the conclusion that a more integrated approach is necessary. It is also
an important objective of our research program to combine scientific relevance with
relevance for social policy. Our strategy will be to propose a broader theoretical approach
to the functioning of labour markets. This will hopefully enable a more complete insight
into the operation of labour markets. The subsequent application of the concept of trans-
itional labour markets should help us to establish under what conditions the values of
efficiency, equality, social justice, social security and optimal lifetime societal participation
can be realized. Finally, empirical research will show to what extent the values that
concern us here are actually realized.
Our central value-laden research problem is:
Which institutions and which institutional mixtures promise to support a optimal mix
between efficiency and justice seen in a lifetime perspective? (cf. Schmid 1994: 259)
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6.2 The optimal situation model and the perfect labour market
6.2.1 The optirnal sitr~ation model
Our point of departure is the socio-economic equilibrium model that is proposed by
Parsons and Smelser (1956). This neo-functionalist model has more recently been further
elaborated, refined and extended (Munch, 1982, 1984, 1991; Van Wezel and Kuperus,
1990; Van Wezel and Havekes, 1995). It theoretically models a society in its optimal
situation. It is not presumed that any empirical society strongly corresponds to this optimal
situation. The model provides us with a perspective for the empirical study of society. It is
a cooperation or communication model, not a harmony model. The model takes account of
the existence of parties with opposing interests which, however, can be resolved, e.g. by
democratic consultation.
The starting point is a social system 'interpenetrating' with its environment. A system is
able to continue its existence in a changing environment only if the following conditions
are fulfilled.
1. The problems of 'adaptation to the environment', of 'the attainment of collective
goals', of 'the integration of parts' and of 'the durability of long-term trends of
pattern-maintenance have to be solved. The four functions are: Adaptation, Goal-
attainment, Integration and Latency. Together they constitute the AGIL framework.
2. Specialized units and institutions, fulfilling these four functions, exist. These are:
the Economy, the Polity, the Community and the Social-Cultural system.
3. Mutually dependent subsystems are related by exchanges of inputs and outputs
which implies that they depend on each other for their continued existence. Diffe-
rentiation and specialization go together with integration. This integration takes the
form of interpenetration.
At the level of society the four functions are fulfilled by the following specialized units:
- the function of adaptation by the Economy;
- the function of goal-attainment by the Polity;
- the function of integration by the Community;
- the function of pattern maintenance or latency by the Social-Cultural system.
We conceive these units as coordination regimes which are interlinked by media of
interchange and exchange relations. Actors from different spheres of social life use these
media of interchange and enter into exchange relationships. It follows that the coordination
regimes of the economy, the polity, the community and of the social-cultural system
interact with each other. In the optimal situation we speak of 'interpenetration' of coordi-
nation regimes. The respective coordination mechanisms associated with the coordination
regimes distinguished are: money, power, influence, and commitment. Six exchange
relationships can be distinguished in a society with the four subsystems or coordination
regimes. We shall only consider the three exchange relationships involving the economic
system.
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The exchange processes are mediated and governed by money, power, influence and
commitment. The central proposition of the optimal situation model is: '... under properly
defined conditions a system high in energy but low in information can be effectively
controlled by a system with the observed characteristics - that is low in energy but high in
information' (Parsons 1978: 375). This hypothetical situation can be compared with the
relationship between a horse and its rider. The horse is much stronger, has much more
energy than the rider. Nevertheless the rider can steer and control the horse bringing about
a perfect unity. Similarly, in the case of the optimal societal situation, the coordination
regimes of the Economy and the Polity are more energetic and flexible than the coordina-
tion regimes of the Community and the Social-Cultural system. These last two regimes
contain much more social-cultural information. Under conditions of 'interpenetration' an
optimal mix of energy and information has been mustered. Such an institutional mixture of
the four coordination regimes represents a flourishing marriage between economic efficien-
cy and social justice. Social exclusion is absent.
It is possible to specify the exchange relationships with the economy in the case of 'inter-
penetration' (see scheme 8). Arrows represent inputs from one system to another one. The
letters M, P, I and C designate the media of interchange Money, Power, Influence and
Commitment. The letters f and p are abbreviations of factor and product. A factor is
pushed from the sending system to the receiving system. A product is pulled by the
receiving system.
The horizontal axis shows a money exchange of 'allocation of capital' (from the polity to
the economy) and 'control of productivity' (in the opposite direction). Here, we have to do
with decisions of monetary and political actors on the one hand and of economic actors on
the other hand. The money exchange is mediated by an exchange of power. In general
horizontal exchange relationships are seen to be means-creating. This also applies to the
exchange relationships between the Economy and the Polity. In this connection invest-
ments decisions within the Economy are of primary importance: they are pre-eminently
means-creating. In the optimal situation there is a favourable mixture of the coordination
regimes of Economy and Polity.
The diagonal relations are integrative. Organization and entrepreneurship are involved
here. The model indicates a money exchange of 'claims to scarce resources' (by the
economy on the community) for the 'ranking of budgets' (opposite direction). This money
exchange is mediated by exchange of influence, here taking the form of standards for the
allocation of resources and for the accountability of claims. In the optimal situation of the
coordination regimes of Economy and Community are favourably hanging together. The
system of labor relations is located on this diagonal axis.
The vertical exchange relations are regarded as goal achieving. Links are created between
production and sales. There is a money exchange of wage income and demand for goods
and services. This money exchange is mediated by an exchange of commitment to provide
labour on the part of employees and of a commitment to create employment among the
employers. In the optimal situation there is a favourable mix of the coordination regimes
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of Economy and the Social-Cultural System.
Recent research by Putnam (1993) has empirically and theoretically revindicated some
important insights formulated by classical authors as De Tocqueville and Weber. In his
analyses of contemporary Italy Putnam discovered that age-old differences in civic enga-
gement explain the persistent variations in 'political and economic performance' among
the Italian regions. Where voluntary associations thrive 'good government and 'good
economy' are observed and can also be causally explained from high levels of 'civic
engagement' . In other words a flourishing community helps engender the solidarity and
trust, in the absence of which organization and entrepreneurship can only suboptimally
exist. Putnam stresses the importance of dense, horizontal networks and the norms of
reciprocity they generate (Putnam 1993: 163-185; 176).
Economy
Allocation of capital. Mlp.
Control of productivity, Mlf.
Opportunity for effectiveness, Pif.









Scheme eight:The optimal situation model (Van Wezel~Havekes, 1995, p. 44)
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It should be mentioned that the analysis of Putnam strongly concurs with Schmid's ideas
about equality and efficiency (Schmid 1994).
6.2.2 The perf~ect labour mnrket
The optimal societal situation implies a perfectly functioning labour market. The labour
market is seen as an interchange-zone between the economy and the social-cultural system.
The perfect labour market combines economic flexibility and rationality with security and
justice. Societal exclusion is minimal. Which are the conditions for the perfect labour
market to exist?
There is one boundary condition, and four direct conditions can be mentioned. The boun-
dary condition states the necessity of a good combination of human resources and techno-
logical resources. Scheme 9 shows the several stages that can be distinguished in the
development of such a well-tuned combination. (Parsons and Smelser 1956: 139).
Scheme 9. The fine-tuning process of human resources and technological resources
Phases Human Resources Technological Resources





Three Trained Capacity Technological Know-How
Four Generalized Labour Power Generalized Purchasing
Power








Seven Utilization in Task Perfor-
mance
Utilization in Task Perfor-
mance
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To attain the stage of optimal fine-tuning the 'human capital developing institutions'
(family, educational system, firms; M. Brinton 1993) are crucial. Here we touch upon the
topics of module four of our research for the European Commission: Training and Human
Capital Investment. There must be open borders between the several phases in the process
of human capital formation. The institutional spheres involved also have to be characteri-
zed by open borders to each other. The ideas of J. Dronkers and J. van Hoof about flex-
ible interconnections between education and labour (1980; 1986; 1990) tally with the
stage-model of Parsons and Smelser. The flexibility approach emphasizes three main
phases in the process of human capital formation:
1. primary socialization and general, non-occupational education;
2. interconnections between occupational education, apprentice systems, getting practi
cal experience, on-the-job training, measures for re-training, updating courses;
3. internal training courses within firms.
The interconnections in stage 2 strengthen the capacity of supply and demand to adapt to
changes in the conditions of employment and the labour market. A good threefold system
of educational institutions is essential to prevent social exclusion.
We now come to a discussion of the four direct conditions for the perfect labour market
(Parsons and Smelser 1956: 114-123; J. van Wezel and M. Havekes 1995: 56-59). Before
doing that two points should be emphasized: in the labour market the human factor has to
be motivated, and labour can not be dissociated from the person of the employee. In the
evaluations of employees considerations of justice play a role, not just those pertaining to
productivity. Physical factors merely have to maintained (Parsons and Smelser 1956: 134,
137). Therefore a perfect labour market is not only flexible, it also has to be experienced
as conforming to standards of justice.
The first function concerns the adaptation function of the labour contract. Here a balance
between the interests of the employer(s) and those of the employee(s) has to be struck.
This condition is very important in our research module 'Households and Working Time
Flexibílity'.
With respect to the organization of work we endorse the following analysis: '... on the
organization side ego's contract involves him in a set of adaptive relations to other units;
this is the organizational context of his role, which includes both the availability of non-
social facilities and co-operation of other role incumbents' (Parsons and Smelser 1956:
115). An individual's ability to function in other social contexts should be preserved.
To give an example: in the perfect labour market the housewife does not function as a
time-buffer integrating the time-frameworks of labour, leisure, education, care for children
etc.. which according to Elchardus' diagnosis of the time- buffer-function of the housewife
has been the case into the 1970's (Elchardus 1996: 29-32). This actual situation of the
time-buffer function of the housewife was a deviation from the perfect labour market. In
the perfect labour market employer-employee are such that women are not excluded from
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the ]abour market. Though employers prefer flexibility of working time, they have to make
optimal use of human and technological capital; they have obligations to consumers,
banks, sub-contractors etc..
With respect to the household situation the following analysis applies: 'On the household
side, ego must be left a margin of freedom from organizational involvement to adapt to
certain household exigencies and secondary those of other roles. Conversely, household
demands must be adjusted to allow the fulfilment of occupational obligations. The prob-
lem is to strike a balance. The regulation of the demand of time for work is obviously one
of the main mechanisms which facilitates this balance' (Parsons and Smelser 1956: 115).
In this connection the recommendations of Elchardus are valuable: a four day workweek
in combination with longer firm-times; security in combination with flexibility amongst
other things to be achieved via cooperatives; the idea of a time-fund to stimulate transi-
tions between social security, education, work, care etc.; an explicit regional time-ordening
policy (Elchardus 1996: 78-95). The legal protection of labour regarding hours of work
and hiring and firing practices are also relevant here (Knegt a.o. (eds.) 1995: 53-107).
The second direct condition involves the goal-attainment of employers and employees: a
balance between labour services, output and wages is needed. In general a power balance,
facilitating cooperation, between employers organizations and unions is necessary if this
condition is to be met. Collective agreements and their declaration of being generally
binding (Knegt a.o. (eds.) 1995: 11-S1), institutions of income protection (Knegt a.o. (eds.)
1995: 155-208) and minimum wage regulation can be conducive to the attainment of this
second condition.
The third condition is a balance in the integrative aspects of the employment contract. The
quality of working conditions and the quality of labour services then go hand in hand. Em
ployees show loyalty and responsibility, and employers provide good facilities, autonomy
and for instance relative security of (re)employment etc..
Here, institutions that optimize labour participation and the quality of work are necessary.
Again the significance of high levels of 'civic engagement' and its concomitants (horizon-
tal networks, strong norms of reciprocity etc.) have to be stressed.
The fourth condition is a balance of value pattern. Employees have to be motivated to do
their job that has to be experienced as attractive. Employers have to take care of an
efficient organization of work and productivity. Cultural institutions help to fulfil this
condition.
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6.3 Deviations from the optimal societal situation and from the perfect labour market
6.3J A provisional integrated socio-economic model: the optimal societal situation and
its deviations
It is possible to model three deviations from the optimal situation of interpenetration:
- inflation and deflation of inedia of interchange;
- the possibility of restrictions with respect to the realization of one or more of the
functions that we distinguished: adaptation, goal-attainment, integration and pattern
maintenance. We are especially interested in the functioning of the economy.
Therefore we distinguish four restrictive states of the economy which we regard as
substantive models of the middle range: the supply model (restrictions on adapta-
tion), the demand model (restrictions on goal-attainment), the organization model
(restrictions on integration), and the model of the greedy economy (restrictions on
pattern maintenance).
- types of societal patterns or figurations each of which is a deviation from the
optimal societal situation of interpenetration.
The model of the optimal situation model and the deviations from the optimal situation,
when applied together, provide information not only about forms and processes of exclu-
sion and íntegration which are potentially possible, but for example also about any new
form of social exclusion which might have arisen compared to twenty years ago. Our
theory might contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of socia] exclusion and
integration and it might help anticipate possible developments with respect to exclusion
and integration in the coming years.
We consider the interactions between economic, political, social and cultural factors that
can explain the dynamics of exclusion and integration.
A comparative analysis within an integrated approach of the interrelated role of institutions
and actors will provide a useful tool for the understanding and differentiation of different
causes of social exclusion:
- more structural and generally relevant causes;
- more specific causes:
for a given social group
for a particular form of exclusion
for a given time and country
presenting broader European features.
The overall theme of our proposal is:
The building of a more comprehensive comparative institutional, inter-actor and
interdisciplinary model that can be usefully applied for the explanation of exclusion
and unemployment in Europe. The model should contribute to the design of a new
model for the development of the European Union, as mentioned in the 'White-
book' of the European Commission (1994: chapter 10, 175-181). The following
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sections will develop constitutive parts of our model.
The explanatoi~~ scheme to be used
The provisional framework of the model can be laid out as follows. According to Mouze-
lis (1995) a distinction can be made between the institutional structure and the figurational
structure. The institutional structure is a system of interrelated roles, positions and rules,
which we can break up into Economy, Polity, Community and Social-cultural system. The
Agil-scheme, elaborated into a model of the optimal situation and into models of deviati-
ons, gives us clues as to the compatibility or incompatibility of institutions. We can
characterize these institutions in terms of the dimensions of technology, control and
ideology. If these dimensions are incompatible, strategic behaviour and games between
actors are important.
In order to characterize these games it is important to take account of the positional and
the dispositional characteristics of the actors. In addition, the features of the interaction-
situation are important. Finally, the hierarchical character of the games is important,
together with the fact that actors utilize economic, political, social and cultural capital.
Drawing on tl~e dimensions of the institutions (technology, control and ideology) we will
relate to each other the institutional structure and the figurational structure, i.e. the system
of interrelated actors. It follows that it is not only the system of interrelated institutions of
economy, polity, community and social-cultural system that is important. The figuration of
interdependent actors, which influences the reproduction and change of institutions, is
equally important. The actual relations of co-operation andlor conflict between (collective)
actors affect the institutions in the next phase.
Following Boudon (1981: 97-98, 99-107, 109-123, 123-129) we distinguish three types of
institutional processes, two of which are processes of change. Boudon's explanatory
scheme depicts causal and feedback processes between the institutional context, the
interaction system and macro-outcomes (outputs).
The first type of process is called repetitive process. There is neither feedback from the
macro-output to the actions of the actors nor to the institutional context (see scheme ten).
Here we see a disjunction of structure and actions; repetitive processes do not cause any
changes in the existing coordination mechanisms, which we see as located in what Boudon
calls the interaction system, and the institutional pattern of coordination. Actors reproduce
the institutions using current rules and coordination mechanisms.
The second type of process is a cumulative process (see scheme eleven). There is a
feedback from the output to the actions of actors. The institutional context remains un-
changed. Examples of cumulative processes are inflationary and deflationary processes.
The institutional context is disjunct from both the interaction system and the output. This
implies a disjunction of coordination mechanisms and actions.
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The third type of process is a transformation process. Here we see feedback from the
output to the institutiona] context. The institutional context changes. In this case there is a
disjunction of actions and structure (see scheme twelve).
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This explanatory scheme amounts to a combination of (historical-)institutional analysis
with the investigation of interactions (or phenomena that can reasonably expected to be
related to interactions).
A very inspiring, recent example of its use can be found in M. Brinton (1993). She
criticizes some influential current theories (e.g. the human capital theory) for being 'cul-
turally quite narrow.' Her point of departure is: 'The social-institutional context and the
normative patterns of human relations vary among industrial societies. These variations
need to be -and can be- theoretically formulated.' Therefore, in order to analyse and
explain the economic role of women in postwar Japan she sets out to adjudicate 'a balance
between an explanation ... based on individual, voluntaristic action and one based on the
institutional structures of society...' (Brinton 1993: 17) In short, she argues for 'a more
cultural and social-institutional approach...' (Brinton 1993: 78) that has to be comparative
as well. In line with modern historical sociology, however, Brinton recommends, to restrict
cross-societal comparisons to a limited number of well-chosen cases.
In her research she conducted careful (historical-)institutional analyses of the 'human
capital developing institutions' (family, educational system, firms). In this way the institu-
tional context (the environment) was established. Guided by her knowledge of the institu-
tional context Brinton then went on to formulate hypotheses about the values, attitudes,
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preference and actions of the relevant actors. Finally, a survey was conducted to test the
hypotheses. This survey yielded very interesting results to a large extent due to the cul-
turally and institutionally accurate information which had resulted from the (historical-)in-
stitiitional analysis. Brinton was also able to produce some interesting comparisons of
Japan with the USA.
6.3.2 Inflation and deflation of inedia of interchange
In the optimal situation there is neither inflation nor deflation of the media of interchange.
In reality, the media of interchange -money, power, influence and commitment- are
susceptible to inflation or deflation.
Money is the capacity to buy goods and services. In the case of money inflation the
purchasing power of money decreases. In the case of money deflation the purchasing
power increases.
Power is the generalized symbolic capacity to make and make stick decisions on behalf of
a collectivity. Power inflation comes about when uncredible threats become frequent. The
use of power increases without a concomitant increase of binding decisions. It is only the
very powerful who make effective decisions. The effectivity of power peters out. The
number of political decisions does not decrease. Small groups yield power based on the
threat of violence.
Influence is the generalized capacity to shape attitudes or opinions by implicit or explicit
appeals to common group membership. Inflation of influence occurs when actors try to
exert influence without support in the community. In that case the will to arrive at com-
promises is absent. Sharp divisions within the community arise. The use of influence
increases but solidarity does not. Deflation of influence can often be observed when
influence has only a narrow base, for example colour, ethnicity, age, sex or education.
Commitment is the capacity to specify values in order to make them applicable in particu-
lar situations. Inflation of commitment is the will to implement too many values at the
same time. This leads to moralizing. Values tend to become deplete of ineaning. There is
a lot of discussion but straightforward measures are seldom. People lose their trust. Defla-
tion of commitment involves sticking to one's own values implying the incapacity to take
into account other values.
We expect that inflation of money generates the inflation of power, of influence and of
commitment. Thus we expect money inflation to concur with ineffective political power,
with divisions and exclusionary processes within the community and, finally, with value
erosion. Processes of inflation can suddenly turn into deflation. Miinch (1991: 356-362)
has suggested propositions about the relationships between inflation, deflation and societal
dynamics. We can use these propositions to explain exclusion and to explain transitions
between integration and exclusion in both directions. Which are the key factors that
influence the back and forth between exclusion and re-integration? We have introduced the
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key factors of integration in the model of the optimal societal situation. Following our
diagnosis of the causes of exclusion, we can hopefully formulate recommendations as to
re-integration policies.
6.3.3 Theories of the middle range about deviations from the optimal societal situation
We use four theories of the middle range: the supply model, the demand model, the
organization model and the model of the greedy economy.
In the optimal situation model there are no restrictions on supply. The supply side of the
economy is situated in the zone between the economy and the polity. It is the locus of the
supply of production factors, especially capital. Restrictions on supply cause a decrease of
investments.
In the optimal situation there are no restrictions on the demand side of the economy. In
the case of the demand model there are restrictions on the demand side. The demand side
is part of the interchange zone between the economy and the social-cultural system.
Restrictions on the demand side diminish the sales of goods and services as a consequence
of a decrease in demand for goods and services.
In the optimal situation model no restrictions on the organization side of the economy
exist. The organization side is placed in the interchange zone between economy and
community. The organization model refers to restrictions on the organization side of the
economy. Restrictions on the organization side hamper innovations in product-markets, in
production processes and tend to prevent new combinations of labour and capital.
Restrictions on the pattern maintenance of the long term economic culture are absent in
the optimal situation. The cultural aspect of the economy is crucial. The model of the
greedy economy depicts restrictions on this aspect. These cultural restrictions within the
economy weaken the orientation on long-term productivity. Consumption tends to prevail
over production. In modern institutional economics situations like these are often analyzed
in terms of low trust and opportunism.
The supply model
Specific research themes in relation to the supply model are: cross-national and
longitudinal analyses of laws, political intervention and the use of governmental
power as they relate to exclusion, unemployment and integration.
Some questions to be answered are:
Are the main characteristics of present forms of exclusion in the European Union
connected with the supply model?
Are there structural supply conditions, producing social exclusion?
Can we identify the social groups, which are more vulnerable to social exclusion,
because of the actuality of the supply model?
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Do different social policies affect the role of unemployment as a cause of social
exclusion?
Is the actuality of the supply model in particular connected with long term unem-
ployment?
We investigate the changing mechanisms of regulation and deregulation with
respect to their relevance and pertinence to social exclusion and integration.
Attention will be given to the role of changes in the social welfare system as
expressed by new budgetary, fiscal and economic policies.
High wage costs, high real wages, high collective expenditures, social regulation by the
state are indicators of the actuality of the supply model. The supply model functions as a
cause of social exclusion. The concrete causes in this case can especially be found in
political developments.
The process can be summarized as follows:
1. Suppose there are restrictions on the supply side.
2. These restrictions on the supply side have a negative influence on the decisions to
invest.
3. Economic actors decide to invest less.
4. Lower investments cause lower production, lower sales and therefore lower demand
for employees.
5. Lower demand for employees influences the labour market as interchange zone
between the economy and the social-cultural system.
6. The outcome is an imperfection in the labour market caused by supply restrictions.
The demand model
Specific research themes in relation to the demand model are:
Cross-national and longitudinal analyses of values, lifestyles and private consump-
tion, opinions about preferred set of societal arrangements, commitment to labour
and to employment as they relate to exclusion, unemployment and integration will
be taken up.
Some questions to be answered are:
Are the main characteristics of present forms of exclusion in the European Union
connected with the demand model?
Are there structural demand conditions, producing social exclusion?
Can we identify the social groups, which are more vulnerable to social exclusion
because of the actuality of the demand model?
This part of our research will pay special attention to the relation between part-time
labour and social exclusion, unemployment and integration, further to time-ordering
and the situation within households. Also relevant is the study of the role of new
flexible time arrangements in reducing the social exclusion that is associated with
unemployment. We shall investigate processes and factors of social exclusion
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related to family, health, education, value systems and the distribution of paid and
unpaid labour within households.
Many possible decreases in demand can lead to the actuality of the demand model. Some
indicators are large price-rises, (real) wage reductions, cuts in benefits and excessive
saving.
The process can be summarized as follows:
1. Suppose restrictions on the demand side.
2. Consumers decide to spend less.
3. Producers react with a decrease of production because of a decrease of sales.
4. The decision to produce less leads to a lower demand of employees.
5. An imperfection of the labour market has come into being caused by restrictions on
the demand side.
A specific topic related to the demand model is the problem of the division of unpaid
housework and paid full-time or part-time labour between partners in households.
The labour market is an interchange zone between the economy and the social cultural
system. An important condition for a perfect labour market has to with the balance which
the parties to the labour contract have to strike in their relations with other people (third
parties).
As human beings with other roles, responsible for children, partners, members of voluntary
associations etc., employees seek to hold time sovereignty in order to fulfil these other
roles. Employers are related to third parties like competitors, banks, subcontractors, many
of them having to take respond to the globalization of production and other changes in the
international division of labour.
The labour market contract has to allow both partners to fulfil the requirements of the
relations with their respective third parties. Under certain conditions, part-time work can
favourably affect this balance. Equally important, in this context, are new trainingleduca-
tion schemes, the development of new service activities and the vulnerability associated
with new information and communication technologies.
The organization model
Specific research themes in relation to the organization model are:
The investigation of the interactions of social norms, solidarity and labour relations
in order to discover their impact on processes of exclusion, unemployment and
integration. This should be done by conducting cross-national, longitudinal and
case studies.
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Some questions to be answered are:
Are the main characteristics of present forms of exclusion in the European Union
connected with the actuality of the organization model?
Are there structural organization conditions, producing social exclusion?
Can we identify the social groups, which, because of actuality of the organization
model, are relatively vulnerable to social exclusion? The vulnerability of the low
qualified segment of the labour force is of crucial importance here.
Specia] attention will be given to the comparative analysis of recent changes in
labour relations and in labour market regulation and social policies as possible
causes of unemployment and deterioration of the conditions of the unemployed.
Problems of solidarity will also be approached on the basis of an analysis of the
voluntary sector. Special attention will be given to the role of 'civic networks','-
civic engagement' (Putnam) and 'civil rights' (Schmid), encouraging organization
and entrepreneurship.
Comparative case studies of real life conditions, experience and views of the social
groups concerned will also be of great value. Cross-national, longitudinal and case
studies of processes of the formation of the relations between ethnic groups and
their impact on exclusion, unemployment and integration are part of our research.
If the organization model is actual, the execution of entrepreneurship is inhibited which
causes a lack of innovation in the economy and a concomitant lack of inclusion of new
labour supply. Members of minority groups, young entrants and women are the main
victims. Exclusion increases and solidarity decreases. A division within the labour market
between insiders and outsiders arises. In this case social developments cause exclusion.
Organization restrictions can have several causes:
- the existence of non-representative advisory bodies operating in the field of eco-
nomic policy;
- an unbalanced profit rate;
- the absence of community level measures regulating allocation and distribution,
aimed at giving direction to the economy. There are several possibilities here: a
lack of general accepted goals of social-economic policy; the existence of free
wage policy for the market sector in the absence of central agreements; the absence
of a link between wages and benefits; too much or too little differentiation of
wages; a lack of consensus about labour time; in general insufficient institutional
arrangements between government and social partners.
Restrictions on the organization side cause a lack of innovation. The process can be
summarized as follows:
l. There are restrictions on the organization side.
2. The actors of the community, especially employer and employee organizations, do
not provide standards for the allocation and distribution of scarce resources and for
the organization and combination of labour and capital.
3. The reaction of the economic actors results in a lack of innovation in the economy.
The prevailing situation is maintained and there are limits to entrepreneurship.
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There is no synthesis of economic and social considerations.
4. Because of the lack of innovation there are few new jobs and few new enterprises.
5. The growth of new jobs stagnates and the employers decide to demand less new
employees.
6. The conclusion is that there is an imperfection in the labour market resulting from
organizational restrictions.
The model of the greedy economy
Specific research themes in relation to the model of the greedy economy are:
Cross-national and longitudinal analyses of both institutionally mediated and mar-
ket determined socio-economic distributive outcomes will be set up, designed to
elucidate their relationships to exclusion, unemployment and integration. Exceptio-
nal poverty will be analysed as an instance of social exclusion in contrast to the
case of exceptional wealth. We shall try to explain the income-distribution and
analyse the feedback of political, social and cultural developments, especially the
impact of social exclusion on the performance of the economy. Important in this
context is the interaction between local and national labour markets, and between
the transnational and international monetary systems. By doing this new causes of
social exclusion might be identified.
Some questions to be answered are:
Do the main characteristics of present forms of exclusion in the European Union
bear any relation to the model of the greedy economy?
Do conditions exist which hamper the development of the levels of 'trust' needed
to generate the transactions that enable the cooperation in the absence of which no
'gains from trade' can arise?
Are there structural conditions, given Europe's position in the world context, which
cause the actuality of the greedy economy?
The model of the greedy economy is a consequence of restrictions on the pattern mainte-
nance of long-term economic orientation on productivity (loyalty, motivation). Restrictions
on the pattern maintenance aspect of economy are related to motivations of economic
actors which erode economic-cultural resources. This finds expression in:
- a strong orientation on money and the pursuit of gain in the short-term;
- an exceptional increase of the income of topmanagers and a decrease of the income
(including benefits) of poor people;
- a careless attitude towards nature and environment.
Monetary developments contribute to the actuality of the model of the greedy economy.
Important in this connection is the current institutional context of the monetary system
which is characterized by:
- overconsumption, an imbalance between consumption and production;
- decreasing investment rate, saturation of investments;
- no fixed exchange rates and insufficient supervision of the money markets by the
30
monetary authorities;
- weak links between the financial capital used for speculative purposes, and capital
that is put to use for prosperity enhancing trade and for productive investments;
- short-term speculation.
A short term reaction to this financial uncertainty is flexibility of the labour market. In the
model of the greedy economy the turbulence in the financial market is transferred to the
labour market resulting in a sharper division between the poor and the rich people. We are
especially interested in the feedback effect of social exclusion on the social and economic
performance of the economy.
6.3.4 Idealh'pical deviations from the optimal situation of interpenetration
In the optimal societal situation of interpenetration the relationships between the four
institutions -Economy, Polity, Community and Social-Cultural System- are strongly
developed. There is specialization or differentiation. The institutions have the capacity to
meet the functional requisites of adaptatioi~, goal-attainment, integration and pattern-
maintenance. At the same time integration is brought about by processes of communicati-
on and by exchanges of inputs and outputs: e.g. mediated by the functioning of dense,
horizontal networks and reciprocity. Dynamics and controlling go hand in hand. The
capacity to adapt to the environment is well-developed. The same can be said about the
level of internal integration. Parsons has referred to this type of social system as 'Society'
(Parsons, 1977: 182). 'Society' is therefore an idealizing, not-descriptive concept.





In the case of conflict the separate institutions are strong. The exchange-zones, however,
are weak. There is no communication between the actors and the result is conflict. There
is no base for compromises.
In the societal type of adaptation the dynamic institutions, i.e. economy and polity, are
dominating the controlling institutions, the community and the social-cultural system.
Dynamic prevail, directional stability is absent. The situation is characterized by flexible
market dynamics which suppresses justice and security. There is flexibility of employees,
but no flexibility for employees. In other words the time-sovereignty, which would allow
the employee a measure of freedom in the organization of herlhis working time, is mis-
sing. (Elchardus 1996: 14).
With respect to the case of adaptation the judgment of Scott Lash is relevant: 'The point I
want to argue here is that the ghetto has been emptied out of all these economic and
social-cultural institutions - of markets, labour markets, commodity markets and capital
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markets; of the industrial branch plants of corporate hierarchies, of corporatist institutions
such as trade unions, of welfare institutions, and of regulation by the family ... Disorgani-
zed capitalism ... brings what Wacquant has called the 'hyperghetto', in which all these
institutions disappear from the ghetto. The result, and that is the basis of the constitution
of the black underclass, is a deficit of such institutional regulation' (Scott Lash 1994: 161-
l62).
A third type is the rigid system. Here the controlling institutions strongly prevail over the
dynamic institutions. This societal type is the reverse of the societal type of adaptation.
A last type is isolation. There is differentiation between the four institutions. But the
actors do not relate to each other. There are no mutually supporting exchanges. So societal
performance is suboptimal.
6.3.5 Deviations from the perfect labour market
The perfect labour market combines flexibility with security; we refer to this combination
as flexsecurity. There are two main deviations from the perfect labour market:
the flexible labour market without controlling which implies the absence of security;
the rigid labour market without flexibility.
Characteristics of the flexible labour market without security are:
- a bad correspondence between human capital and technological resources, caused
by technological determinism and the dominance of occupational and labour market
education over general education;
- the prevalence in the employment contract of the interests of employers with
respect to each of the AGII.-aspects.
The characteristics of the rigid labour market are the opposite of the characteristics of the
flexible labour market without security. The interests of employees are prevailing.
According to Parsons and Smelser (1956: 173-175) a systematic classification system of
market imperfections can be built in five steps.
The first step is to locate the place of the interchange zone of the market. Relevant here is
the interchange zone between economy and the social-cultural system.
The second step is the choice between the possibilities of the consumers' market or the
labour market as interchange-zone. Here the choice is the labour market.
The third step takes account of the aspects of adaptation, goal-attainment, integration and
pattern maintenance which govern the market transactions.
In a fourth step we can establish which aspects are especially relevant for some markets,
and assign them their proper weight.
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The last step bears upon direction in which the aspects of adaptation, goal-attainment,
integration and pattern maintenance gravitate: in the direction of the economy, the
employers, or in the direction of the social-cultural system, i.e. the employees.
We can utilize this strategy to redefine the perfect labour market and the three types of
labour markets, which are mentioned in section four: the occupational markets, the internal
firm-bounded markets and the non specific open markets.
Parsons and Smelser employed three sub-types of the labour market (1956: 147-156)
which are very similar to the three types we referred to. They distinguish the following
types:
- markets for labour services at a low level of technical competence and involving
low degree of organizational responsibility - non-specific open labour markets;
- markets for executive services - partly occupational markets;
- markets for professional services - partly internal firm-bounded markets.
In the perfect labour market the goal-attainment aspect has a high weight. There is no
specific advantage for either the employer or the employee. Occupational markets are
structurally similar to the perfect labour market. The aspects of goal-attainment and
integration are also heavily weighted. Employees are relatively more interested in the
integration aspect whereas employers are more interested in the adaptation aspect. Internal
firm-bounded markets especially emphasize the internal aspects of the employment con-
tract: the aspects of integration and pattern-maintenance. The aspect of adaptation is only
weakly emphasized. The interests of employees are important for the goal-attainment
aspect and interests of employers for the adaptation-aspect. The non-specific open labour
markets are strongly tilted in the direction of the interests of employers. The aspects of
adaptation and goal-attainment are very important here.
7. Some concluding remarks
In this paper we have tried to broaden Schmid's theoretical conception of the transitional
labour market. The goal was to propose a more comprehensive theoretical framework that,
conceived as a formal model, may sensitize researchers to possibly relevant factors, actors
and processes.
We have used a neo-functionalist theory as the organizing guideline. The main reasons for
this choice are its comprehensiveness and the fact that it provides us with a conception of
equilibrium.
By linking the chosen framework to Boudon's explanatory scheme we have suggested a
way to connect the abstract concepts of the general model to causally interpretable obser-
vables which are organized in terms of simplified models.
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In the section discussing some middle range theories about deviations from the optimal
societal situation we proposed a number of more specific research themes that will be
addressed in subsequent research'.
The authors are members of the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University,
The Netherlands.
Written comments are highly appreciated and should be directed to Prof. Jan van
Wezel, Tilburg University, P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands,
fax f31 13 466 2370, E-mail J.A.M.vWezelC~kub.nl or F.T.S.KerstholtC~kub.nl
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